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Case
Law Update
2002
& 2003
Compiled
and Edited by:
Carly Capello, Patrick Baldwin and Melissa Dorris
UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
4th
Circuit
5th
Circuit
11th Circuit
ALABAMA
FLORIDA
GEORGIA
LOUISIANA
MISSISSIPPI
NORTH
CAROLINA
SOUTH
CAROLINA
UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
Defendant-Petitioner
Atkins was sentenced to death by the Supreme Court of Virginia for convictions
of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. Based on evidence that
Atkins suffered from mild mental retardation, he appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, claiming that the Eight Amendment prohibited his execution.
The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed its decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989),
and held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment places a substantive restriction on states' powers to impose
the death penalty on mentally retarded persons. The Court noted that the
practice was unusual (30 states expressly prohibited execution of mentally
retarded persons), and concluded that a national consensus had developed
against it. Construing the Eighth Amendment in the according to evolving
standards of decency, the Court concluded that such punishment, as applied
to mentally retarded persons, was excessive. Taking issue with the relevancy
of the data relied on by the majority to assess the evolving standards
of decency, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia both filed dissenting opinions.
They joined, along with Justice Thomas, in each other's opinion.
In re
Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002)
Stanford had
been sentenced to death in Kentucky for the crimes of robbery, rape, and
murder of a gas station attendant, which he had committed when he was
age seventeen. The Supreme Court in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989), had previously concluded that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment did not prevent states from imposing the
death penalty on 16- and 17-year old juvenile offenders. The Court further
ruled, therefore, that Stanford's execution would not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in the absolute sense, nor would it constitute
cruel and unusual punishment in light of the "evolving standards
of decency" analysis, since no national consensus existed against
the execution of juveniles.
In light of
the court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
on mentally retarded persons), Stanford petitioned the court for a writ
of habeas corpus. A majority of the court denied his petition without
issuing an opinion.
However, Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in a dissenting opinion by Justice
Stevens, recommending reconsideration of the issue of the constitutionality
of sentencing juvenile offenders to death. In light of the Court's reasoning
in its recent opinion Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the dissent
argued that the same rationales for prohibiting imposition of the death
penalty on mentally retarded persons should apply to persons who were
juveniles at the time of their offense.
Bd.
of Educ. V. Lindsay Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002).
In
Lindsay Earls, the Respondent students sued Petitioner, board of education,
alleging that the board's policy requiring all students participating
in extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing violated the students'
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. The United
States Supreme Court held, however, that the policy did not constitute
an unreasonable search because it reasonably served the board's important
interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students. The
board's general regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the
expectation of privacy among students, and the board's method of obtaining
urine samples and maintaining test results was minimally intrusive on
the students' limited privacy interest. Further, the drug testing policy
was a reasonably effective means of addressing the board's concerns about
preventing drug use in the board's schools in the face of the evidence
of increased drug use at the schools.
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter dissented, finding that
the particular testing was not reasonable under "all the circumstances
of the search" and was even perverse. This was based on the fact
that the policy targets a student population least likely to be at risk
from illicit drugs. Thus, the dissent found that the policy invades the
privacy of students who need deterrence the least, and risks steering
away students at greater risk for substance abuse from extracurricular
involvement that may potentially palliate drug problems.
Patterson
v. State of Texas, 2002 WL 1986618 (2002).
In Patterson, the petitioner had been convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death for a crime he committed when he was 17 years old.
The Court denied applications for stay of execution of sentence of death
and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The dissent, however, stated
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the taking of the life of a person
as punishment for a crime committed when below the age of 18. Thus, the
dissent believed the Court should have granted a stay of execution and
confronted the question at the September conference.
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4th
Circuit
United
States v. Butler, 50 Fed. Appx. 120 (4th Cir. 2002)
Appellant Butler appealed his convictions and sentences for being a felon
in possession of a firearm and for being a felon in possession of ammunition
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1) (2000). He argued that the
lower court improperly "double counted" two prior convictions,
committed when he was under eighteen, to determine his base offense level
and criminal history for purposes of establishing his 'felon' status under
the sentencing guidelines. The Fourth Circuit concluded that while sentencing
guidelines limit the use of some juvenile convictions for calculating
criminal history, the fact that a conviction resulted from a crime committed
before the defendant was eighteen will not automatically remove the conviction
from consideration. Thus, the court held that because the challenged convictions
were adult convictions and resulted in sentences over one year, the convictions
were properly included in the calculation of Butler's criminal history,
citing USSG § 4A1.2(d)(1).
U.S.
v. Kelley, 23 Fed. Appx. 107 (4th Cir. 2001)
In Kelley, the defendant appealed his sentence for possession
with intent to distribute five grams of cocaine base. The defendant argued
that the district court erred in counting his juvenile adjudications in
his criminal history score under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §
4A1.2(d)(2)(2000). Specifically, the defendant argued that USSG §4A1.2d(d)(2)
violated the Equal Protection Clause since it automatically treats juvenile
adjudications like adult sentences for criminal history purposes, although
the juvenile justice system is based on principles and goals that are
different from the adult juvenile system. The 4th circuit, however, upheld
the constitutionality of §4A1.2d(d)(2).
U.S.
v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555 (4th Cir. W. Va. 2002)
In Mason, the defendant appealed the trial court's sentencing
determination that he was a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 4B1.1 (1998). The defendant argued that the court incorrectly
counted his 1981 state conviction for unarmed robbery, committed when
he was sixteen as a predicate for career offender status. The 4th circuit,
agreed, finding that because the defendant received a juvenile sentence
for the 1981 robbery conviction, the conviction could not serve to make
him a career offender.
** Unlike
Mason, which focused on the use of prior juvenile convictions for computation
of career offender status, Kelley focused on the constitutionality of
using prior juvenile offenses as points in computing the criminal history
score.
U.S.
v. Hairston, 152 F. Supp. 2d 894 (N.D. W. Va. 2001)
In Hairston, the defendant objected to a presentence report which
included his juvenile conviction for possession of cocaine. The defendant
argued that because at the time he committed the juvenile offense, state
law provided for the expungement of juvenile records, and therefore, under
USSG § 4A1.2(j), the court erred in considering the expunged record
in the calculation of his criminal history. The court, however, concluded
that a conviction was "expunged" under USSG § 4A1.2(j),
only if the expungement was related to reasons of innocence or errors
of law.
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5th
Circuit
Foster
v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766 (5th Cir. 2003)
Appellant Foster had been convicted for a murder committed during the
course of a robbery at the age of 17 and sentenced to death. He brought
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.S. 2254 (1996), claiming, in part,
ineffective assistance of counsel. Foster claimed that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to move to transfer his case to the youth court
and for failing to sufficiently investigate mitigating evidence such as
evidence that his family was abusive and that he abused alcohol at a young
age.
The court
denied Foster's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failure to
investigate, holding that counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue
the presentation of the potentially mitigating mental health evidence
and the potentially mitigating family background evidence. Thus, the representation
did not fall below "an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms" because it was objectively reasonable
for Foster's counsel not to present evidence which could be "double-edged"
in nature.
The court
also affirmed the district court's finding that Foster's counsel was not
ineffective for failing to move to transfer the case to youth court because
even if his counsel had made the motion, it was unlikely that the outcome
would have been different, given Foster's age and initial findings about
his mental state. Therefore, the representation satisfied the Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), standard governing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Roe
v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395 (5th
Cir. Tex. 2002)
In Roe, plaintiff's parents had sued the Texas Department of Protective
and Regulatory Services ("TDPRS") and social worker, Beverly
Strickland, after Strickland visually searched the juvenile's body cavities
without a court order. The district court dismissed the claims against
the agency and denied the social worker's motion for summary judgment,
to which the social worker appealed. The 5th circuit concluded that the
social worker did violate the juvenile's Fourth Amendment rights in conducting
the visual cavity search as the special need exception to the warrant
and probable cause requirement did not apply given the child's strong
interest in bodily privacy. However, because it was unclear at the time
of the search (1999) whether the special needs doctrine applied to a social
worker's visual search of naked juveniles, the court found that the social
worker was entitled to qualified immunity.
Gachot
v. Stadler, 298 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. La. 2002)
In Gachot, the district court had granted a conditional writ of
habeas corpus based on the apparent involuntariness of defendant juvenile's
confession to the homicides of his parents made while under police interrogation.
The State appealed, arguing that the juvenile's right against self incrimination
had not be denied, that the confession was free and voluntary made, and
that the district court erred in not giving due deference to the Sate
court's ruling. The 5th circuit, reversed, holding that the State court's
determinations were entitled to deference under the federal corpus statute,
28 U.S.C.S. §2254. In addition, the court found that the State court's
decision was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law.
United
States v. Peters, 283 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. Tex. 2002)
In Peters, appellants sought review of their sentences for conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting possession
with the intent to distribute crack cocaine. The 5th circuit affirmed
appellants' sentences, stating that even though one was a juvenile at
the time of the conspiracy, he "ratified" his involvement in
the conspiracy by continuing to participate in the crack cocaine sales
and by delivering crack cocaine to one of his dealers and accepting the
proceeds of a crack cocaine transaction.
Moore
v. LA. Dep't of Public Safety & Corrections, 2002 WL 17791996 (E.D.L.A.
2002)
In Moore, the Mother, individually and on behalf of minor who
sustained injuries while housed in a dormitory for juvenile offenders,
brought action against the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
and individual employed there as a correctional sergeant, alleging violations
of federal civil rights law and state negligence law. The defendant cross
moved for summary judgment arguing that the claims are barred because
Moore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42
U.S.C. §1997 e(a) and La. R.S. 15:1184 (A). Specifically, the Defendant
asserted that the state Administrative Procedure remedy guidelines required
Plaintiff to file an administrative complaint within 30 days after the
alleged incident. Although Plaintiff's counsel submitted a letter to the
warden detailing his complaint 60 days after the incident, the Defendant
claimed that the untimeliness of the letter precludes Plaintiff from relying
on the letter to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The court, however, found that Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative
remedies. In so holding, the court relied on Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516 (2002) and Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 293 (5th Cir. 2002)
and stated that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. §
1997e, is not jurisdictional in nature and mandatorily applies to isolated
incidents of excessive force claims. Furthermore, in rare circumstances,
the exhaustion requirement may be excused where dismissal would be inefficient
or would not further the purposes of the PLRA.
Thus, the court held upheld the district judge's finding that administrative
officers have discretion to waive the 30 day deadline and that since the
warden had not responded to Plaintiff's letter, Plaintiff had not failed
to exhaust his remedies. In addition, the court noted that because Plaintiff
was a juvenile in state custody when the 30 day filing period was running,
his having filed his administrative complaint 30 days late was not unreasonable.
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11th
Circuit
Hart
v. AG for Florida, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3911 (11th Cir. 2003)
Appellant Hart was allegedly involved in a robbery/homicide when he was
seventeen years old. He and accomplices had attempted to use stolen credit
cards to enter a photography studio where customers paid to watch models
undress. After the cards were rejected, they left and decided to go back
and rob the business. Hart's conviction was based primarily on a statement
he gave to police in which he confessed to participating in the robbery
and on physical evidence that discredited Hart's statement in which he
denied killing the victims. This confession had been obtained while Hart
was being detained in connection with the incident after an investigator
known to Hart from a previous investigation told him that "honesty
wouldn't hurt him," and that she could not advise him as to his decision
to hire an attorney.
On appeal,
Hart claimed that the waiver of his 5th Amendment rights and ensuing self-incriminating
statements were the product of deception and not made with a full awareness
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of
the decision to abandon it as required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
at 475 (1966).
The 11th Circuit agreed, saying that the lower courts should have used
a "totality of the circumstances" approach, which, in this case,
suggested that Hart's confession was not voluntary. While Hart's youth
at the time of the interrogation was a factor in his favor, the court
also noted that Hart asked about getting a lawyer, which indicated that
he did not understand his 6th Amendment rights. Further, the investigator
told Hart that a disadvantage of having a lawyer was that a lawyer would
direct Hart not to answer questions that the investigator would ask him,
thus misleading him about the purpose behind the 5th Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination. This contributed heavily to the court's finding
that Hart's waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing and intelligent.
Robinson v.
Moore, 300 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2002)
In 1986, Robinson was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed
robbery and sexual battery and was sentenced to death on the murder conviction.
He petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel. He based his claim, in part, on the argument that
his counsel should have presented evidence that he was at one time a juvenile
incarcerated in an adult prison, which would have been mitigating evidence
against imposition of the death penalty. Robinson claimed that when he
was arrested as a juvenile, he lied about his age, which he claimed caused
him to be incarcerated in adult prison for the offense. However, the records
were unclear as to whether Robinson was actually sentenced to adult prison
as a juvenile or served any substantial time there.
The 11th Circuit
denied his claim, finding that Robinson had not demonstrated the prejudice
necessary to mandate relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. In
dicta the court noted that the fact that Robinson may have at one time
been a youth imprisoned in an adult prison was not necessarily mitigating
or probative evidence because there was no evidence of what happened to
Robinson in the adult prison, assuming he was ever sent to one.
U.S.
v. Acosta, 287 F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. Fla. 2002)
In Acosta, the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation
of U.S.C.S. § 846. At sentencing, the issue was whether the court
could use the defendant's prior youthful adjudication as a prior conviction
for purposes of a sentencing enhancement. The 11th Circuit answered in
the affirmative, holding that under Federal Law, a youthful offender who
pled guilty and was adjudicated is considered to have suffered a prior
conviction, even if the state law did not consider him "convicted"
and his record was sealed.
Marsh
v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. Ala. 2001)
In Marsh, the plaintiffs brought a civil rights action, alleging
that they were severely injured while they were an inmate and detainee
in an Alabama jail due to the deliberate indifference of government officials
responsible for their protection and care. In determining whether the
plaintiffs' alleged conditions that amounted to cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment to overcome a qualified immunity defense, the
court considered the fact that there was no segregation of juveniles from
adults as to constitute a substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoners.
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ALABAMA
Ex Parte
Carroll, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 285 (Ala. 2002)
At age 17, Carroll and an accomplice committed a murder during the course
of a robbery of a dry-cleaning and coin-operated laundry establishment.
After deliberating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the jury
recommended a life sentence, but the court overrode that recommendation
and imposed the death penalty.
In its sentencing
order, the trial court found one aggravating circumstance - that the murder
was committed during a robbery -- and four mitigating circumstances including
the absence of a significant prior criminal history, the age of the defendant,
the favorable testimony of the defendant's family and the jury's recommendation
of life imprisonment without parole.
The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed Carroll's conviction but reversed the sentence
of death. In so holding, the court reasoned that the court improperly
considered Carroll's incarceration for youthful-offender adjudications
in negating the mitigating circumstance of no significant criminal history,
in direct violation of the holding in Ex Parte Burgess, 811 So. 2d 617
(Ala. 2000). The court noted, however, that a trial court may use a defendant's
juvenile adjudications to diminish the weight of the mitigating circumstance
of no prior criminal history, and that of the defendant's age at the time
the capital offense was committed, but the trial court may not use the
juvenile record to negate the mitigating circumstance altogether.
Ex parte
Webb, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 189
Defendant Webb was charged with first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery,
and second-degree assault. After a hearing, his case was ordered to be
transferred from juvenile court to circuit court, where he was to be tried
as an adult. Webb appealed this transfer order, but the circuit court
nevertheless proceeded to indict him, accept his guilty plea, convict
him, and sentence him to 20 years imprisonment before his appeal of the
transfer order was heard.
On appeal,
Webb challenged the trial court's jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea
and to adjudicate his case arguing that, at the time of those proceedings
in the trial court, his appeal of the transfer order was pending before
the appellate court. The state supreme court affirmed the general rule
that jurisdiction is proper in only one court at a time. Although the
trial court could proceed on collateral matters while the case was pending
in the appellate court, it could not consider any matters central to the
appellate court case. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction over Webb's case
by the trial court in its adjudication on the merits was improper because
it assumed that the circuit court had jurisdiction, which was the very
subject of the issue then on appeal. Webb's conviction and sentence were
vacated, and the case was remanded for decision on the appeal of transfer
of jurisdiction before trial of Webb's case on its merits.
H.N.P.
v. State, 2003 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 39 (SUBJECT TO CORRECTION OR REVISION
BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTER)
A Deputy Sheriff overheard defendant speaking on her cellular phone at
a restaurant, using profanity that embarrassed other restaurant customers.
The officer told defendant not to speak like that in a public place. Defendant
lowered her voice but continued to use obscene language. She also made
an obscene gesture to the officer when she later walked past him. On appeal
from the circuit court's delinquency adjudication, the appellate court
found that the evidence was insufficient to find that the defendant committed
disorderly conduct because her "obscene" language did not constitute
"fighting words" that would trigger physical retaliation, and
the adjudication of her delinquency was therefore reversed.
C.M.
v. State, 2002 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 239
C.M. had been adjudicated delinquent for unlawful possession of marijuana
for other than personal use and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia.
He appealed this adjudication on the grounds that he was not appointed
counsel at his adjudication. The court ruled that since the juvenile court
made clear that C.M. was being placed on probation rather than being committed
to a youth detention facility, and therefore, C.M. would not lost his
liberty, C.M. was not entitled to appointed counsel. The court noted,
however, that the juvenile court, by denying him counsel, had foreclosed
its option of later placing C.M. in a youth detention facility.
State
v. R.R.A., 2002 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 159 (SUBJECT TO CORRECTION OR REVISION
BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTER)
R.R.A. was indicted for theft of property for allegedly stealing $53,443
from a credit union while he was employed there. He turned 21 years old
on February 5, 2001 and the acts occurred between December 11, 2000, and
May 17, 2001. The Judge at trial ordered that R.R.A. was eligible to be
considered for treatment under the state's Youthful Offender Act, Ala.
Code § 15-19-1(a) (1975).
The appellate
court ruled that R.R.A. was eligible for treatment as a youthful offender
if charged with a crime committed in his minority. Because the crime charged
was theft by deception, a continuing offense that was not completed until
a date after R.R.A.'s 21st birthday, R.R.A. was not eligible for treatment
as a youthful offender, and the Judge's order was rescinded.
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FLORIDA
Bell
v. State, 2002 Fla. LEXIS 2381 (NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED)
Seventeen year-old Bell received a sentence of death for the murder of
his girlfriend's landlord. According to statements made by Bell and the
other juvenile accomplices, the victim had made inappropriate sexual advances
toward Bell's girlfriend and her friend. In response, Bell and the accomplices
beat Richards and transported him to a wooded area where they chained
him to a tree, beat him, set him on fire, and slit his throat.
Bell appealed
his death sentence claiming in part that the trial court did not properly
consider the statutory mitigator that defendant was 17 years and 10 months
of age when he committed murder. The appellate court agreed, holding that
it is only after a trial court makes a finding of unusual maturity that
the trial court can exercise discretion in assigning diminished weight
to the mitigator. There was no finding of unusual maturity by the trial
court in this case, so the court should have given full weight to the
mitigating factor of Bell's age, being so close to the age of 16, at which
age the death penalty cannot be imposed. The full weight of this mitigating
factor made the death penalty inappropriate in this case, and Bell's sentence
was reduced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
State
v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2002)
Defendant J.M., a 14 year-old juvenile, was charged as an adult with sexual
battery. J.M. plead nolo contendere to the charge, and the trial court
exercised its discretion to adjudicate him delinquent. At the disposition
hearing, experts testified that J.M.'s offense was not typical of the
type committed by a chronic sexual offender, that incarceration would
serve no purpose, that J.M. was amenable to treatment, that J.M. did not
present a high risk of reoffense, and would likely be rehabilitated. They
recommended against J.M.'s placement in any higher-level, residential
juvenile sexual offender program that specialized in more serious, older
offenders. After juvenile sanctions were imposed, the State requested
that J.M. be classified as a sexual predator as would be an appropriate
designation for an adult convicted under the same statute.
The court
of appeals reversed the sexual predator designation. The Supreme Court
affirmed this ruling, holding that adjudications of delinquency were not
included within the statutory provisions of the Predator Act, Fla. Stat.
ch. 775.21 (2000). Disapproving the holding in Payne v. State, 753 So.
2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), the court held that juvenile who were charged
as adults, but were actually adjudicated as delinquents, do not stand
criminally convicted for the purpose of designation as a sexual predator
under the Predator Act.
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GEORGIA
Murray
v. State, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 313 (NOT FINAL UNTIL EXPIRATION OF THE REHEARING
PERIOD. OPINION UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BY THE COURT.)
Murray, a juvenile, was convicted of malice murder and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with a shooting
in which Murray fatally shot the purchaser in a drug deal whom Murray
believed had shortchanged him. Murray was 15 at the time. Before the interrogatory
interview in question, he was informed that he was in custody and being
charged with the murder. He did not ask to speak with his parents nor
was he denied access to a telephone or prevented in any way from contacting
family members. During this interview, he confessed to the offenses. The
interrogation lasted 36 minutes; during 10 of those minutes, Murray listened
to a statement made by a friend to whom Murray had confessed the crime.
Murray never repudiated his custodial statement, but testified in his
own defense at trial, giving the alternative explanation that he shot
the victim accidentally and when it appeared that he was still alive,
he cut him repeatedly with a razor blade.
Considering
the totality of the circumstances, the court determined that the incriminatory
statement was knowingly and voluntarily given under Riley v. State, 128
226 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 1976) and its progeny, and that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting it into evidence, even though his
mother was not notified and was not present while it was made. The statement
was not rendered inadmissible merely because it was made in the absence
of a parent. Moreover, Murray's age alone did not make his waiver ineffective.
In re
J.M., 276 Ga. 88 (Ga. 2003)
In the bedroom of his girlfriend's parents' house with the door wedged
closed by a stool, 16-year-old J.M and his girlfriend were engaging in
sexual intercourse when the girlfriend's mother walked in. The parents
did not pursue charges against J.M., but the state initiated delinquency
proceedings; J.M. was adjudicated delinquent for violating O.C.G.A. §
16-6-18 (2002), Georgia's fornication statute.
This adjudication
was reversed, since under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3(a) (2002), defendant
and his girlfriend were legally permitted to engage in consensual sexual
intercourse at the age of 16 and because the right to privacy under the
Georgia Constitution protected from criminal sanction private, unforced,
non-commercial acts of sexual intimacy between persons legally able to
consent.
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LOUISIANA
State
ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26 (La. 2002)
D.J. and A.A., 13-year-old juveniles, were charged and adjudicated delinquent
in juvenile court for attempted second degree murder and carrying a firearm
by a student on school property. They argued, on appeal, that in light
of developments in juvenile law, juveniles should be afforded the right
to elect a trial by jury. The Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed, ruling
that fundamental fairness and due process to not afford juveniles the
right to a jury trial during the adjudication of a delinquency charge
in juvenile court. Reasoning that extending juveniles the right to trial
by jury would undermine the flexibility of the juvenile judge as the trier
of fact, which allows the judge to consider social and psychological factors,
family background, and education in order to shape the disposition to
serve the best interests of the child, the court adhered to rulings from
the United States Supreme Court and the vast majority of other jurisdictions
in holding that the constitution does not require a trial by jury in a
juvenile proceeding.
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MISSISSIPPI
Buck
v. State, 838 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 2003)
Buck was arrested for two counts of sale of cocaine to an undercover informant
when she was sixteen years old. She and her mother wished that she be
certified for trial as an adult against her lawyer's advise. The court
accepted this request and ordered her confined in an adult facility. After
her plea trial and conviction in circuit court, she filed a motion for
post-conviction relief, arguing failure of statutory procedure since no
motion to transfer had been filed, that neither she nor her mother understood
the ramifications of being transferred, that the youth court failed to
find no reasonable prospects of rehabilitation within the juvenile justice
system, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Supreme
Court held that the transfer of the juvenile case to circuit court was
not proper because the transfer was not initiated on motion of the youth
court prosecutor or on the youth court's own motion. The court determined
that the youth court judge should not have transferred the case without
making specific statutory findings and without conducting a bifurcated
hearing. As to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court
found that Buck failed to establish that her representation prejudiced
her. Counsel's assistance was not ineffective given Buck's insistence
about the transfer despite her attorney's opposition to doing so.
Horne
v. State, 825 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 2002)
Horne, a 14-year old defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and
capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole for involvement in the murder of a convenience store clerk during
the course of a robbery. At a hearing upon motion to transfer Horne's
case to youth court, the court refused to transfer Horne's case to youth
court without considering the two factors required under State v. U.G.,
26 So. 2d 151, 154 (Miss. 1998) (best interest of the minor; and the interest
of justice).
The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the circuit court erred in
failing to consider these factors. However, the court ruled that this
error was harmless and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
given the heinous nature of the crimes and the marginal evidence that
youth court jurisdiction was in the best interests of the minor.
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NORTH
CAROLINA
In re
M.G., 576 S.E.2d 398 (N.C. App 2003)
14 year old appellant M.G. was adjudicated delinquent for yelling a profanity
at a group of students in a school hallway. The teacher that reported
the incident left his assigned position monitoring the cafeteria during
lunchtime to escort M.G. to the student detention center and to notify
the dean and the resource officer before returning to his duties.
M.G. appealed
the adjudication, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss
the disorderly conduct charge based on the insufficiency of the teacher's
testimonial evidence. The appellate court, however, affirmed the refusal
to dismiss the case because viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the state, it was sufficient to establish that M.G.'s conduct substantially
interfered with the operation of the school. The teacher's absence from
his duties sufficiently disrupted school operations to justify upholding
the delinquency adjudication.
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SOUTH
CAROLINA
State
v. Standard, 351 S.C. 199 (S.C. 2002)
The 15 year-old defendant committed armed robbery, for which he was convicted
as an adult and given a youthful offender sentence. Shortly after his
release, he and two others broke into a mobile home, vandalized the residence,
and stole cash, jewelry, and other items, for which he was given a life
sentence without parole.
He challenged
his sentence on the grounds that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the sentence of life imprisonment
without parole did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and that
the sentence did not offend evolving standards of decency despite defendant's
age at the time he committed the armed robbery, noting that a large number
of states permitted severe punishments for youthful offenders. Thus, South
Carolina's Two Strikes Law, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (2001), did
not impose an unconstitutional sentence on defendant.
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